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(IRCMS) to analyze the performance of aircraft control bearings used in the flight control system of the Navy's S-3
aircraft. The IRCMS is used to determine whether changes can be made in preventative maintenance prorcedures,
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This thesis uses the Naval Air Systems Command Integrated Reliability Centered
Maintenance Program software (IRCMS) to analyze the performance of aircraft control
bearings used in the flight control system of the Navy's S-3 aircraft. The IRCMS is used
to determine whether changes can be made in preventative maintenance prorcedures, or if
redesign of the system is warranted. We show in our analysis that each bearing should be
redesigned.
In our research, we analyzed and established a historical bearing failure data baseline of
current reliability and maintenance costs. We developed a mathematical model to
determine the effects of using improved bearings, currently available from commercial
manufacturers, on bearing reliability and life cycle costs. We show that failure rates can be
reduced by 50 percent, and maintenance costs can be reduced by 48 percent, which
represents $16,000 in annual savings over the remaining life of the aircraft.
We show that an increase in bearing and flight control system reliability is important
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This research will identify and analyze those hardware components in the S-3
aircraft's flight control systems that are degrading system readiness and reliability. This
will be accomplished using the Naval Air Systems Command's (NAVAIR) version of
Reliability Centered Maintenance (RCM) software, Integrated Reliability Centered
Maintenance Software (IRCMS). IRCMS is a tool for performing and documenting a
RCM analysis.
A statistical analysis of historical failure data is also performed, and an optimum
maintenance plan, using components manufactured with advanced processes, is
developed for the components identified.
B. Objectives
The objectives of this thesis is to utilize NAVAIR' s RCM program and statistical
analysis to identify readiness degraders, and improve the reliability of the flight control
system through either optimized preventative maintenance, or utilization of improved
components. Through use ofRCM and statistical analysis, components with poor
reliability can be identified, and cost/benefit tradeoffs can be accomplished in order to
seek optimal solutions to achieving increased reliability.
C. Research Questions
The thesis will answer the following questions:
1 . What is RCM, and how is it used to improve system readiness?
2. How is Integrated Reliability Centered Maintenance Software (IRCMS) utilized
to analyze data?
3. What are the top readiness degraders of the S-3's flight control system?
4. How are these degraders impacting maintenance?
5. Is there preventative maintenance (PM) established for these components, and is
this preventative maintenance effective?
6. What are the failure modes of the degraders? What factors contribute to failures?
7. Can reliability of the system be improved through changes in scheduled
maintenance, an optimized maintenance plan, or replacement of the components?
8. What is the cost/benefits of the analysis output?
D. Scope, Limitations, and Methodology
The scope will include: (1) identifying the top readiness degraders of the S-3
aircraft's flight control components, (2) an analysis of those components using
NAVAIR's IRCMS software, (3) developing an optimum maintenance plan that
minimizes total expenses, (4) impact of the components on life cycle maintenance costs,
and (5) an analysis of current preventative maintenance procedures that apply to the
components discussed. The thesis will conclude with recommendations to improve
system reliability.
The methodology used in this thesis research will consist of the following steps:
1 . Conduct a data base search of aviation maintenance data (AV-3M) from the
Naval Aviation Maintenance Office, and cognizant field activity (CFA) data
from the Naval Aviation Depot (NADEP) at North Island, Ca., to identify
what flight control components are suiTable for RCM analysis.
2. Using NAVAIR's IRCMS software, analyze the components to determine
failure modes, and causal factors.
3. Research current maintenance requirements for applicability to the selected
components.
4. Determine environmental exposure of selected components by inspecting
component location on the aircraft.
5. Through interviews with maintenance personnel from VS-41, the S-3 Fleet
Replacement Squadron (FRS) at NAS North Island, determine maintenance
times required to remove and replace the selected components.
6. Using reliability models, determine the availability probabilites for the
components.
E. Organization of the Study
Chapter II describes NAVAIR's RCM program structure, and provides the basis for
the thesis study. Chapter III provides and explanation of assumtions used to develop the
RCM analysis. In Chapter IV, the components that will be analyzed are identified. In
Chapter V, the IRCMS program is used to determine a course of action. In chapter VI, a
statistical model is developed to show historical maintenance costs, and the effect on
costs if improved components are used. Chapter VII presents conclusions and
recommendations.

II. NAVAIR's RCM PROGRAM
A. Introduction
Reliability: The probability that a system or product will perform in a satisfactory
manner for a given period of time when used under specified operation conditions [Ref.
I:pl4].
Reliability Centered Maintenance was developed in the United States in the early
1960's, by the civilian aviation industry. It was developed when airline companies
realized that their maintenance philosophies were not only expensive, but dangerous as
well. This realization prompted the industry to put together a series of "Maintenance
Steering Groups" (MSG) to reexamine all processes related to aviation maintenance
practices. These groups consisted of representatives from aircraft manufacturers, the
airlines, and the FAA.
The first attempt at formulating maintenance strategies was promulgated by the Air
Transport Association in Washington, DC, in 1968. This first attempt is known as
MSG1. The first revision, MSG2, was issued in 1970. In the mid 1970's, the
Department of Defense desired to improve its maintenance practices, and commissioned
a report on the subject from the aviation industry. Stanley Nowlan and Howard Heap of
United Airlines wrote this report. They titled it "Reliability Centered Maintenance". [Ref
2] The report was published in 1978, and is considered to be one of the most important
documents in physical asset management.
Nowlan and Heap's report represented a considerable advance on MSG2 thinking. It
was used as the basis for MSG3, which was released in 1980. MSG3 has been since
revised twice. Revision 1 was issued in 1988, and Revision 2 in 1993. It is used today to
develop prior to service maintenance programs for new aircraft types (recently Boeing's
777, and Airbus' 330/340).
B. Program Overview
The Naval Air Systems Command version ofRCM was developed from MSG1 and
MSG2, modified to the Analytical Maintenance Program, and then to the present RCM
program, encompassing RCM analysis and Age Exploration (AE) analysis. NAVAIR's
current directive on RCM is the NAVAIR 4790.20. This instruction describes policy,
procedures, and responsibilities for application ofRCM analysis for systems under
NAVAIR cognizance [Ref 3]. The RCM program is applied in three basic stages:
1
)
To influence design guidelines and equipment design.
2) To develop a preventative maintenance (PM) program encompassing all levels
of maintenance.
3) To continually review and update preventative maintenance requirements
throughout the life cycle of the equipment.
NAVAIR's RCM program is applicable to new procurement and in-service aircraft,
airborne weapons systems, and support equipment. The program includes establishing
priorities during concept and design to influence preventative maintenance requirements.
NAVAIR's RCM management manual, the NAVAIR 00-25-403, provides guidance on
performing the RCM analysis, implementation of results, and sustaining efforts.
NAVAIR's current version of IRCMS, version 5.3.1, is used to perform all NAVAIR
RCM analyses [Ref 4: p 1-1].
C. NAVAIR RCM Program Planning
Development of a RCM program is the first ofmany steps in initiating a program that
maximizes safety and operation availability, reduces overall costs of ownership, achieves
equipment inherent availability, and provides an audit trail for PM requirements. The
RCM program plan describes all processes and procedures that are performed as part of




RCM analysis ground rules and assumptions
2. Scope of initial analysis
3. Sustaining task procedures










12. RCM program plan of action and milestones (POA&M).
This RCM study of the S-3's flight control components will be limited to addressing
items 1, 2, 3, and 6 . Each of the four items will be discussed in detail, in Chapter III.
These four areas constitute the minimum areas needed to start this RCM analysis.
III. THE RCM ANALYSIS PROCESS
A. Introduction




Ground rules and assumptions
2. Scope of the initial analysis
3. Sustaining tasks
4. Effectiveness metrics
It is here that the foundations of the analysis are determined. Specific examples of types
of ground rules and lessons learned that have been used in other programs are provided in
Appendix 1 of the RCM Management Manual [Ref 3]. All assumptions made in
developing this RCM analysis are the author's.
B. RCM Analysis Ground Rules & Assumptions
One of the most important elements in performing and RCM analysis is the
establishment of ground rules and assumptions. In establishing ground rules and
assumptions for this analysis, four factors are of significant importance: (1) failure mode
effects criticality analysis (FMECA), (2) the analysis approach to be used, (3) significant
item selection, and (4) preventative maintenance (PM) requirements. Standard operating
procedures, data sources, analytical methods, cost benefit analysis methods, specific
analysis approach information, default values, and any other appropriate information that
is required for a consistent and efficient RCM analysis effort, are identified.
1. Failure Mode Effects Critically Analysis (FMECA)
The FMECA is one of the major data inputs to, and is the starting point of, the
RCM process. FMEA attempts to predict possible sequences of events that lead to
system failure, determine their consequences, and devise methods to minimize their
occurrence [Ref. 5: p 163]. Criticality Analysis enables the determination of the
occurrence of the failure modes, and the determination of the impact of a failure mode on
the reliability of the system. As such, ground rules & assumptions should also be
included for the FMECA unless previously documented elsewhere such as in a FMECA
Plan. A FMECA will not be done for this study, as failure modes for the components
have been identified by use of malfunction codes documented in NALDA/3M data.
2. Analysis Approach
The analysis approach to be used during the performance of the RCM analysis is a
critical element in the planning and executing process. The analysis approach is
primarily applicable to the FMECA, which in turn influences the RCM analysis. There
are two primary approaches for accomplishing the FMECA/RCM analysis. One is the
hardware approach and the other is the functional approach. The following provides a
brief description of each approach.
a. Hardware Approach
The hardware approach is normally used when hardware items (such as
bearings and control cables), can be uniquely identified from schematics, drawings,
2
Although IRCMS can perform a FMECA, the assumption is that failure modes have been identified at the
time the component was replaced, and each mode is considered to be critical.
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maintenance manuals, and other engineering design data. The hardware approach is
normally utilized in a part level up fashion (increasing indenture levels/bottom-up
approach); however, it can be initiated at any level of indenture and progress in either
direction. Each identified failure mode is assigned a severity classification, which is
utilized to establish priorities for PM task development or redesign. 3
b. FunctionalApproach
The functional approach is normally used when hardware items cannot be
uniquely identified or when system complexity requires analysis from the initial
indenture level downward through succeeding indenture levels. The functional approach
is normally utilized in an initial indenture level down fashion (top-down approach);
however, it can be initiated at any level of indenture and progress in either direction.
Each identified failure mode is assigned a severity classification, which is utilized to
establish priorities for PM task development or redesign.
3. Significant Item (SI) Selection
For this study, SI is defined as a flight control hardware component averaging more
than two failures over a seven-year period. This allows for identification and analysis of
the components with the highest failure rates. The IRCMS significant item selection
logic will be discussed in detail, in chapter IV.
3
For this study, the hardware approach will be used since drawings and maintenance manuals readily
identify all the components.
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4. Directed PM Requirements
Different components may have different levels of maintenance assigned due to the
level effort required to accomplish a given maintenance effort. For the organizational
level of maintenance, the NAVAIR 01S3AAB-4 instruction details the specific PM
requirements that can be performed. At the depot level, PM requirements are identified
in the Standard Depot Level Maintenance Specification (NAVAIR S-3SDLM) for the S-3
aircraft.
C. Scope of Initial Analysis
This element of the process defines the scope of the initial analysis. The scope is the
amount of initial analysis to be performed and will determine the method of analysis
used, and the resources required to complete the tasks [Ref. 4: p 2-6]. The scope of the
analysis will differ according to the phase of the program (new acquisition or in-service),
and the extent and currency of any prior RCM analysis. As the S-3 is an in-service
aircraft, the analysis will address only this phase.
1. In-service Programs - Factors
Many factors are involved in defining the scope for in-service programs. These
factors include, but are not limited to, the following:
1
.
Age of aircraft (life cycle phase)
2. Prior or existing RCM analysis
3. Current maintenance philosophies
4. Number and complexity of aircraft systems
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2. In-service Programs - Plan Steps
In determining the scope of analysis for this thesis, the following steps were
considered relevant to the analysis:
a. CurrentPMProgram Baseline
The current PM program baseline defines the existing PM tasks. The
current version of the S-3's Maintenance Requirements Cards (MRC)4 is the S3ABB-4,
for organizational level PM. The SDLM spec is the NAVAIR S-3SDLM. Any PM
actions on the hardware components are accomplished under the guidelines of one of
these two directives.
b. RCM Candidate Identification and Prioritization
Identifies functions, items, and/or PM tasks to determine which will be
subject to RCM analysis. Prioritizes those that are subject to RCM analysis based on
safety, operational availability, and expected return on investment considerations.
3. Scope Definition
The scope of the initial analysis can be limited by using four methods:
1 . Stake-in-the-ground method
This is a minimum initial effort method. It assumes most current PM tasks are reasonably
justified, and will immediately go into the sustaining phase. Any benefits from RCM will
be via proactive sustaining efforts.
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2. High profile analysis
This is similar to analysis method one above, which consists ofjumping into proactive
efforts of the sustaining phase, such as analyzing high cost drivers except that a higher
initial effort may be warranted.
3. Back-fill method
This is a medium level effort for the initial analysis. It assumes that the current PM
program adequately covers all potential failure modes, but that there may be some PM
being performed that may not be required. A list of items and/or functions is developed
for analysis from existing PM tasks.
4. Complete analysis
This requires the highest initial effort and should be only considered when potential
returns are high, i.e. programs with significant life remaining, and/or high current
maintenance costs, and/or very low reliability.
D. Sustaining Tasks
Sustaining tasks enable continued improvement and refinement of the RCM effort.
The RCM effort can be addressed from two perspectives categorized as either proactive
or reactive. The objective of the proactive analysis is to optimize current PM
requirements, delete unnecessary requirements, predict adverse failure trends, predict
previously unforeseen failure modes, and improve the overall efficiency and
4 MRCs describe preventative maintenance requirements performed by organizational level personnel.
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effectiveness of the RCM/PM program [Ref. 4: p 2-9]. This thesis will use the proactive
approach in order to satisfy the objectives of the study. A number of analysis processes
are used to meet these objectives:
1. Age Exploration (AE) Tasks
Specific AE tasks (or inspections) are implemented where default answers are used in
the initial or updated RCM analysis. These inspections are intended to be of limited
duration to provide data which will verify or correct the default answers. The RCM
analysis will provide the requirements for specific AE inspections. The RCM/AE Plan
provides guidance for the implementation of these AE inspections 5 .
2. Top Degrader Analysis
Top degrader ranking indicates which systems or items are having the highest
operational or cost impact on the aircraft. Degrader measurement factors could include:
maintenance man-hours per flight hour, nonmission capable (NMC) rates, maintenance
actions per flight hour, failure rates per flight hour, failure aborts per flight hour, engine
caused aborts per flight hour, etc.
3. Preventive Maintenance (PM) Document Reviews
PM documents include Maintenance Requirements Cards (MRCs), depot level
maintenance specifications, and any other technical manuals or data, which contain PM
requirements. Periodic review of these documents will reveal outdated maintenance
Although referred to as AE "inspections", they are normally reviews of databases, etc.
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processes, techniques, tools, or supplies, allowing updating to increase effectiveness or
lower cost.
D. Effectiveness Metrics
One of the goals ofRCM analysis is to provide metrics for effectiveness. Types of
metrics are cost avoidances, PM man-hours relative to corrective maintenance man-
hours, end item availability, etc. Effectiveness metrics for this study are minimizing
flight control system downtime resulting from corrective maintenance applied towards
the components identified, and accomplishing this cost effectively.
E. Summary
The items selected for this study will be analyzed using the hardware approach. The





In selecting to analyze hardware components of the S-3's flight control system the
intent is to identify those components exhibiting low Mean Time Between Failures
(MTBF), and high organizational level maintenance man-hour to unit cost ratios. Annual
repair costs (material and man-hour utilization) are two other metrics that will be
determined.
MTBF is a significant factor in system availability and supportability, and the
frequency of maintenance for a given item is highly dependent on the reliability of that
item. As reliability increases the frequency of maintenance and the associated cost of
that maintenance will decrease [Ref.l : p. 27]. By increasing reliability of hardware
components, such as those used throughout the flight control system, the reliability of the
flight control system will increase, and concurrently, maintenance costs will decrease.
B. Flight Control System Components
The S-3's flight control system is composed of several types of simple mechanical
components. Examples are linkages, control rods, control cables, pulleys, and airframe
control bearings. Each one of these components exhibits wear and failure patterns that
can be measured, making each suitable for RCM analysis. Of these various hardware
components, three were considered for this thesis. The decision to limit consideration to
three components was based on RCM initiatives that are currently being addressed by the
S-3 ISST. These three components are control cables, pulleys, and bearings. This
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analysis focuses on airframe control bearings, as an in-depth study has been completed on
the control cables and pulleys .
1. Component Identification
Bearings of various capacities are used throughout the various flight control
systems of the aircraft, and are either of the "radial ball" or "roller" bearing variety.
Airframe bearings are usually of the radial ball bearing type, and they are available in
single row, double row, extra-wide, self-aligning, and rod end types. These bearings are
designed to withstand heavy radial loads in oscillation or slow turning applications, and
in the case of rod end bearings, can be used to link other components such as connecting
a flight control surface to a control rod [Ref. 6: p 450]. The S-3's Illustrated Parts
Breakdown manual, the NAVAIR 01-S3AAA-4-1, identifies the various flight control
systems and locations of each bearing. The S-3's flight control system is identified by the
work unit code prefix of '14'.
Failure data provided by the ISST, Table 1, is a summary of3M data, and shows
that a total of 300 bearings failed over a seven-year period from 1990 to 1997. Of the 20
different bearing part numbers that were provided by the ISST, ten were selected for
RCM analysis due to their higher failure rates. One of the ten was a rod end bearing; the
remainders were radial ball bearings. Only one of the ten bearings requires external
lubrication. 281 of these failures are of the ten part numbers (shown in bold face in Table
1) of interest since they represent 94 percent of total bearing failures. Table 1 lists the
totals for each of the ten bearings.
6 NADEP North Island Engineering Report 001-95.
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Table 1 : Bearing Failure Data
Malfunction Code
20 70 105 170 190 710 127 410
Part Number
DA T62-78A4 14 3 1
KMDB16-9 36
KMDB28-8 35
MS21230-5 25 2 3




SM5-7E-24 4 2 1








KP16BS-FS428 35 2 4
MS28913-4A 41 1 1
MS28913-6A 1 1
TOTALS 261 9 13 4 6 2 1 4
1
Malfunction codes identify the specific failure mode of the component at time of
removal, and are defined by the OPNAV 4790.2E instruction [Ref.7: pp. 1-3, 1-4]. The
majority of failures were shown has having a malfunction code of 20, which indicated
wear as the failure mode.
Appendix A is a summary of3M data provided by the Naval Aviation
Maintenance Office (NAMO). Also shown is the work unit code (WUC), malfunction
code, elapsed maintenance time (EMT), and total maintenance time by part number and
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manufacturer. This summary covers six years of reported data from 1992 through 1997.
Table 2 shows the number of each control bearing used in the flight control system













A review ofNAMO's 3M shows that of the ten bearings identified, only 142
failures were reported. This discrepancy was discussed with ISST team members, and it
was noted that depot data is considered to be business sensitive and not merged with
organizational and intermediate level data [Ref 8]. ISST failure data will be used for
reliability calculations in favor of3M data since the ISST has a larger repository of
bearing data, as they are the CFA for the aircraft. 3M data will be used to determine
organizational level man-hour usage and material cost.
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2. Mean Time Between Failure Data
MTBF was calculated for each bearing using the following equation from
Blanchard [Ref. l:p. 29]:
MTBF = # ofreportedfailures / Total hours ofoperation
As can be seen from Appendix A, each bearing can be used in several different
areas of the flight control systems. 7 79 different WUCs were identified in the 3M data.
For this RCM analysis, failure data is segregated by part number in order to obtain a
baseline MTBF by individual part number. Also, as bearings were obtained from more
than one source calculated values ofMTBF data were not individually determined by
manufacturer, the assumption being that material and technological differences in bearing
manufacture between manufacturers are relatively minor.
The fleet of S-3 aircraft flew a total of 362,383 hours over the seven-year period
from 1990 to 1997. During this period, the total number of S-3 aircraft decreased from
164 to 134. Table 3 summarizes MTBF values for each bearing.
Table 3: MTBF Data












The number of failures that the ISST reported is based on replacement of the items at the
organizational level, and does not reflect depot replacements. Currently, in complying
with NADEP North Island Local Engineering Specifications (LES) 8 , approximately 90%
of all the bearings listed in Table 1 are replaced during SDLM, thus effectively lowering
the calculated MTBF. [Ref 8] Therefore, the MTBF values shown are maximum values.
Of the ten part numbers, six have a MTBF of less than 13,000 hours. If the yearly
average of fleet flight hours is 51,769 hrs, it is readily evident that at least one of each of
these bearings will have to be replaced every year by organizational level maintenance
personnel. For this reason, maintenance man-hour utilization discussed in the next
section will focus on the organizational level.
3. Organizational Level Man-hour Cost Calculations
3M data was used to determine man-hour costs. Man-hour costs for Navy
enlisted personnel of $22.33 per hour, were taken from NAVAIR's Default Data Guide
(DDG) for Level of Repair Analysis [Ref 7: p. 4]. The DDG provides data that is set by
Navy policy, such as manpower costs. Total man-hour costs were determined by
multiplying the enlisted manpower rate by the total man-hours used for each maintenance
action, for each bearing part number. Man-hour costs over the six-year period of3M data
were $62,941 . Total man-hours expended in corrective maintenance were 2819. Table 4
summarizes man-hour cost data for each of the bearings.
7 Work unit codes identify the specific system or subsystem that each component is used in. 14xxxxx
series identify the system as a component of the flight control systems group.
8 LES are local requirements/inspections performed on an aircraft by depot level personnel during SDLM
periods.
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MS289134A 289.10 691.70 $15,445.66
MS21232-6 264.70 578.60 $12,920.14
REP4M6-4FS428 115.80 152.90 $3,141.26
KMDB28-8 35.20 49.70 $1,109.80
MS21230-5 174.89 298.23 $6,659.55
MS21230-6 95.30 165.05 $3,685.57
MS21230-7 76.60 154.50 $ 3,449.99
DAT62-78A4 133.40 382.20 $8,534.53
KMDB16-9 70.70 119.10 $2,659.50
KP16BS-FS428 50.20 226.70 $5,062.21
TOTALS 2,818.68 $62,941.20
4. Component Cost Data
Unit prices for each of the bearings were obtained from Commander, Naval Air
Pacific, Technical Research Office, and is shown in Table 5. Replacement costs totaled
$31,723.60, and were determined by multiplying unit cost by the number of reported
failures (from ISST data).
Table 5: Bearing Unit/Total Costs
Part Number #of
replacements
Unit Cost Total Costs
MS2 1230-7 13 $ 15.96 $ 207.48
MS289134A 43 $46.14 $ 1,984.02
REP4M6-4FS428 17 $ 46.74 $ 794.58
KMDB28-8 35 $209.40 $ 7,329.00
MS21230-5 30 $ 11.61 $ 348.30
MS21230-6 34 $ 11.24 $ 382.16
MS21232-6 14 $ 10.34 $ 114.76
DAT62-78A4 18 $654.54 $11,781.72
KMDB16-9 36 $191.84 $ 6,906.24
KP16BS-FS428 41 $ 45.74 $ 1.875.34
TOTALS 281 $31,723.60
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Seven of the ten bearings have unit costs that are less than $50.00 each, and their
replacement costs totaled $5,707. These seven bearings represented only 18 percent of
the total replacement costs. The three bearings with unit prices in excess of $100.00
represented 82 percent of total replacement costs.
C. Military Specifications and Aircraft Control Bearings
Aircraft control bearings used in Naval aircraft are manufactured accordance with
U.S. Government standards dexcribed in the applicabel military specifications
(MILSPEC). MIL-B-7949E, dated 9 April 1981 is the current specification. MIL-B-
6039E is applicable to rod end bearings (REP4M6-4FS428 is the only rod end bearing is
this study). Both of these MILSPEC prescribe material characteristics, axial and radial
load ratings that have to be achieved. Qualification of radial dynamic loading is
accomplished by applying a specified radial load in a test fixture and oscillating the
bearing through an arc of 90 degrees and bac to the starting position for 1 5,000 cycles.
The bearings are then inspected for looseness and excessive roughness. MIL-B-6039
adds the additional requirement that the rod end be exposed to a dusty environment as
part of the test. Neither MILSPEC requires simulation of the aircraft's operating
environment, and while bearing performance can satisfy MILSPEC, real world results
may not be satisfactory.
In his 1994 memorandum "Specifications and Standards - A New Way of Doing
Business", former Secretary of Defense William Perry state that the Department of
Defense must increase access to commercial state of the art technology. 9 Bearing
9 SECDEF Policy Memo on MILSPEC & MILSTD Reforms, 22 June 94.
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manufacturers are still using MILSPEC to qualify airframe control bearings that they
provide to DOD, primarily due to safety concers. Continued dependence on MILSPEC
provides no incentive for bearing manufacturers to provide more advanced bearings even
though the technology is currently available to do so [Ref 11].
D. Summary
In a seven-year period from 1991 to 1997, twenty different airframe bearings in the S-
3's flight control system had 300 documented failures. Of these twenty, ten bearings
exhibited ten or more failures, and these ten were selected for RCM analysis. On average,
this equates to seven or less failures per year for each part number for the entire fleet of
132 S-3 aircraft. The remaining ten bearings had three or less documented failures, and
had MTBF rates in excess of 50,000 hours.
Each of the ten bearings conform to military specifications developed in the
1980s. Manufactures still use MILSPEC to supply bearings to DOD, even thought the
majority of them are manufacturing bearings that significantly exceed the MILSPEC
oscillation standard.
For the seven-year period, organizational level maintenance man-hours used to
replace the failed bearings totaled $63,000.00 Bearing replacement costs were
$31,723.00 Total combined costs were $94,723.00.
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V. THE IRCMS ANALYSIS OF SELECTED BEARINGS
A. Introduction
The IRCMS is the Naval Air Systems Command's software program for performing
and documenting the RCM and FMECA. Commercial software can also be used for
RCM analysis, however, approval is required from AIR-3.2B. 10 The software used in
this analysis was downloaded via the Internet, from the Naval Aviation Maintenance
Office home page.
The program follows the logic contained in the NAVAIR 00-25-403 RCM
management manual. Based upon input to the decision logic used in the program,
IRCMS will recommend either: ( 1 ) no changes required, (2) a change in PM
requirements, or (3) component redesign. The analysis can be performed on stand-alone
IBM compatible personal computers. The current version of the software is 5.3.1.
B. The RCM Analysis Process
NAVAIR's RCM process is summarized by the following steps, and is shown in
Figure 1.
1) Functional Failure Analysis: defines equipment functions and functional
failures.
2) Significant Item (SI) Selection: establishes which components and systems
will be analyzed, and establishes the component/function as either structurally
of functionally significant.
10
See NAVAIR 00-25-403, page 1-1.
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3) RCM Decision Logic: determines failure consequences, PM changes, and
potential redesign requirements for significant items.
4) Age Exploration (AE) Analysis: determines data gathering tasks needed to














Figure 1 : RCM Analysis Process
1. Functional Failure Analysis
Functional failure analysis is normally accomplished through a FMECA. The
FMECA identifies the item, its functions, its functional failures, engineering failure
modes, effects of failure on the item, and the failure detection method. Although the
IRCMS can perform the FMECA [Ref. 4: p. 3-1], its application is not necessary for this
study as all relevant information has been documented in the 3M database. The functions
of the bearings being studied have been discussed in Chapter IV. Failures are assumed to
28
be detected visually, and can be classified as jammed/frozen, or exhibiting corrosion.
Bearings that are dislodged from their housings are also classified as having failed. And
as stated in Chapter III, flight control component failure is considered to be a safety issue,
therefor any failure is considered critical.
2. Significant Item Selection
Significant items (SI) are divided into 3 groups: structurally, functionally, and
non-significant. The IRCMS determines an item's significance based on the analyst's
answer to the following four questions [Ref. 4: p. 3-6]:
1) Does the function of the structural element carry major ground or
aerodynamic loads?
2) Does the loss of the function cause an adverse affect on operating safety or
mission abort?
3) Is the actual or predicted failure rate of the item or resources high?
4) Does the item have an existing PM requirement?
Structurally Significant Items (SSI) are identified to analyze components whose
failures, if undetected, would have and adverse effect on safety. Components such as
bearings used in flight control systems can be classified as either SSI or FSI, as they are
subjected to aerodynamic loads. However, SSIs, which have non-structural functions
such as rod, ends, hinges, and several of the bearings in this study, should be analyzed as
both FSI and SSI [Ref.4: p. 3-4]. The program's FSI/SSI logic is shown by Figure 2. The
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IRCMS software also allows for default answers to each of the four questions. The
consequences of using default answers are shown in Figure 3
Each of the 10 bearings in this study was determined to be functionally significant
through application of the FSI/SSI logic. SSI classification is suited to components that
exhibit crack propagation, or are exposed to accidental damage. In answering question
one, a decision has to made regarding the bearing's function in the system or subsystem,
as bearings can be either a structural or functional component and SSI analysis is





































Figure 2: FSI / SSI Decision Diagram
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3. RCM Decision Logic Applied to FSIs
After an item is determined to be functionally significant through the FSI/SSI
selection logic, appropriate PM tasks are evaluated for applicability and effectiveness
[Ref 4: p. 3-8]. This process is shown in Figure 3. "Applicability" determines if the task
is appropriate for preventing the failure mode, and "effectiveness" determines if the task
can be performed at some interval that will either reduce the probability of failure to an
acceptable level.
Answers to the following three questions in the decision logic determine
consequences of failure, and whether a PM task is applicable or redesign of the
component warranted. The three questions that are answered:
1) Is the functional failure evident to the crew or operator while performing
normal duties?
2) Does the engineering failure mode cause a function loss or secondary damage
that could have an adverse effect on operating safety?
3) If the failure is hidden, does it have an adverse effect on operation safety?
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1. 15 THE FAILURE OCCURRENCE
EVIDENT TO THE CREW OR OPERATOR
WHILE PERFORMING NORMAL DUTIES?
2. DOES THE FAILURE CAUSE A
FUNCTION LOSS OR SECONDARY
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Figure 3: RCM Decision Diagram for FSIs
In answering question 1 , a functional failure is evident only if it can be detected
by the crew or maintenance technician performing normal duties, and the indication must
be obvious to the crew or maintenance technician. Bearing failures may or may not be
evident to the crew or maintenance technician, and there is no indication system in the
aircraft to warn the crew of possible failure. Some bearing failures will be evident
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through visual inspection (non-hidden failures) performed during operational checks.
However, other bearings are located in areas not accessible visually during periods of
normal operation or periodic maintenance. Functional failure of bearings in this category
will not be evident (hidden), and some disassembly of components will be necessary to
determine causes of failure.
The answer to question 1 determines whether question 2 or 3 is answered next.
In either case, both questions have two failure consequences, and each consequence has a
set of tasks that require evaluation for effectiveness and applicability. For question 2 the
failure consequences are either safety, or economic/operational. For question 3, the
consequences are either non-safety hidden, or safety hidden. Figure 4 summarizes the
effect of failure consequences on effectiveness and applicability criteria [Ref. 4: p3-l 1].
In this study, while the answer to question 1 could either be "yes" or "no" for
each of the ten bearings being analyzed, the answer to both questions 2 and 3 should be
"yes". This is done for two reasons. First, as mentioned in Chapter IV, 300 failures were
reported in ISST data, and the ten bearings selected for RCM analysis are found in 79
different subsystems of the S-3's flight control system. Each bearing would have to be
analyzed using the logic shown in Figure 2. Although there are four failure consequences
(two for each of the paths that can be followed), the first three tasks are identical.
Secondly, since bearings used in the flight control system can be considered as critical to
maintaining system operability and safety, the answer to either question 2, or 3 would
have to be "yes" also. This approach is justified by comparing the two paths that can be
followed. Both have safety consequences and have similar task possibilities, the
exception being the additional Failure Finding task option in the Safety Hidden path.
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FAILURE CONSEQUENCES




EFFECTIVENESS CRITERIA FOR ALL TASKS
Must reduce risk Must be cost effective; Must reduce risk
of failure to an Cost of preventive of multiple
acceptable level maintenance must be less failures to an
than cost of operational acceptable level
loss and/or cost of repair
TASK Applicability criteria
SERVICING/ The replenishment of the consumable or lubricant must be due to
LUBRICATION normal operation and called for by the design
ON- CONDITION 1. Must be possible to detect reduced failure :resistance
(OC) 2. Must have a definable, detectable potential failure condition
3. Must have a consistent age from potential failure to
functional failure
HARD TIME 1 . Must have 1. Must have age where 1 . Must have
(HT) minimum age conditional probability of minimum age below
below which no failure shows a rapid which no failures
failures will increase will occur
occur
2 . A large percentage of 2. (REWORK ONLY)
2. REWORK ONLY) items must survive to this Must be possible
Must be possible age to restore to an
to restore to an acceptable level
acceptable level 3 . (REWORK ONLY) Must be _f failure
of failure possible to restore to an resistance
resistance acceptable level of failure
resistance
FAILURE No other task is applicable and
FINDING effective
Figure 4: Applicability and Effectiveness Criteria Summary
34
The four tasks that are shown in Figure 3 are summarized as follows:
1
.
Service/Lubrication task, which is applicable if the design of the item requires
periodic application of lubricant to avoid the failure mode.
2. On Condition task, which is a scheduled inspection for a potential failure
condition.
3. Hard Time task, which is a scheduled removal of an item.
5. Failure Finding task, which is used only if on condition or hard time tasks are
not effective for hidden failure modes.
Although not shown in Figure 3, Age Exploration tasks can also be accomplished. AE
tasks are developed to collect data to refine default decisions or data included in the
initial RCM analysis. AE tasks may be actual inspections or tests, or simply reviews of
usage or failure data [Ref. 4: p. 3-21].
4. IRCMS Recommendations
The IRCMS manual describes the procedures of data entry into the software. The
process is relatively straightforward, but familiarity with the software is recommended in
order to minimize the time consumed in performing the analysis.
IRCMS provides the analyst fourteen different reports. These reports summarize
the SI total, Failure Modes and Effects, PM Requirements, Failure Consequences for
each of the tasks shown in Figure 3, and Failure Modes / Resulting PM [Ref. 10: pp. 18-
20].
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Using the initial assumptions stated in Chapter III, each of the ten bearings was
inputted into the program. The IRCMS recommended that each bearing should be
redesigned. No On-Condition, Hard Time, or Failure Finding tasks were suggested for
any of these bearings. Figure 5 shows an example of a "Failure Modes/Resulting PM"
report for bearing DAT62-78A4.
MASTER ANALYSIS REPORT
PRELIMINARY REPORT INFORMATION
FAILURE MODE / RESULTING PM REQUIREMENT REPORT FOR BEARINGS
PRELIMINARY REPORT INFORMATION
LCN: DATG2-78A4 FMI:01A01 SIGNIFICANT ITEM: FUNCTIONAL
ENGINEERING FAILURE MODE: WEAR




FLIGHT CONTROL SYSTEM SAFETY IS COMPROMISED
EVIDENT? : N
JUSTIFICATION:
IS NOT READILY EVIDENT TO CREW
ANALYST: LCDR KING DATE: 11/15/97
FUNCTION JUSTIFICATION:





REDESIGN REQUIRED? : Y
Figure 5: IRCMS Failure Effects/PM Requirement Report
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C. Summary
NAVAIR's IRCMS program was used to analyze each of the ten bearings being
studied. Based on the author's initial assumptions developed in Chapter III, the program




VI. RELIABILITY MODELING OF BEARINGS
A. Introduction
As is the case with other mechanical components, bearings are prone to wear and
failure. There are various causes for these failures, and according to one survey, 30%
were traced to the vendor, 66% to the end user, and 4% to external causes [Ref. 11]. The
problems attributed to the vender were incorrect material used for construction, design
errors, and less than optimal workmanship. User induced failures were attributed to poor
maintenance practices, wear, and failure of monitoring equipment. External problems
consisted of contaminated lubricants or faulty lubricant supply systems.
As mentioned in Chapter IV, wear was the primary failure mechanism noted for the
bearings being studied. However, this wear is primarily a result of normal operations for
control bearings. The author proposes that improvements in bearing quality will improve
wear characteristics. Through application of statistical analysis, the effect of increasing
bearing MTBF on maintenance costs will be presented.
B. Mathematical Background
1. Failure Rate Curves
Mathematical analyses ofmany mechanical and electronic components have shown
that failure characteristics follow definite patterns. A plot of failure rate verses time of a
component like a bearing is shown in Figure 6. This curve is known as the '"bathtub
curve" due to its shape. In Figure 6, the initial failures for to Ti are caused by problems












Figure 6: Reliability Bathtub Curve
period from Ti to Tj is called the normal/operating period, and failures in this period are
caused by random overloads and chance failures, and attributed to the user. The normal
period is also the period in which failure rates are constant and minimum. This is also the
period where reliability is the highest, and the least number of failures occur. The last
period, T2 to T = infinity, is the wear out period. Failures in this period are due to
excessive wear after the expected useful design life has been exceeded. The rate of
failures increases rapidly in this period.
2. Reliability Functions
Reliability was defined in Chapter II in terms of probability. Through application of
probabilistic theory, reliability of bearings can be calculated. The mathematical
equations used in the mathematical model were adapted from Rao [Ref. 12].





This equation assumes that the failure times follow an exponential distribution.
C. Spare Part Level Calculations
When the failure time of a component (like a bearing) follows an exponential
distribution, the number of failures in a specified time follows a Poisson distribution
[Ref. 12]. The probability of having n failures in time t is given by:
P(n) = (Xt) B e kt
n!
where X = 1/MTBF. The probability of having enough replacement parts if r spares are
stocked at the beginning of the period is calculated by summing the individual
probabilities over the range of to r number of replacement parts.
When X t is sufficiently large (e.g. greater than 20) a simpler formula, using the
central limit theorem, can be used to determine the number of spares needed in a
resupply lead time, t ,:
NS= Xto+ ZUa (Xt )m
where X t is the mean of the number of failures in time t , and ( X t )
m
is the standard
deviation. Z\.a is the value of the standard normal variate corresponding to the
confidence level a,
D. Mathematical Model of Historical Failure Data
Using a combination of reliability functions, historical failure data, and 3M data, a
mathematical model was constructed to determine both bearing reliability and its
associated maintenance costs. Poisson probabilities were calculated in order to determine
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quantities of replacement parts to support the individual part numbers for a 90 day
period 1 ' . Cost data used in the model are the same as used in Chapter IV.
1. Man Hour and Component Costs
Table 6 is a summary, by part number, of MTBF, failure rate, % of total failures,
# of expected maintenance actions per year, total bearing replacement cost per year, total
maintenance cost per year, and the component cost for two SDLLM replacements. Total
replacement costs per year using the current bearings averaged $12,782 for the seven year
period. This total includes the cost of replacement at the depot. MTBF values, total
component failure data, and unit costs are the same as presented in Chapter IV. The
failure rate, which is the number of failures per unit of time is simply the inverse of the
MTBF.
Table 6 : Historical Failure Data














MS289134A 8,428 0.00012 6 $46.14 $276.84 $2,102.08 $2,378.92 $369.12
KP16BS-FS428 8,839 0.00011 6 $45.74 $274.44 $611.44 $885.88 $914.80
KMDB16-9 10,066 0.00010 5 $191.84 $959.20 $433.84 $1,393.04 $2,302.08
KMDB28-8 10,354 0.00010 5 $209.40 $1,047.00 $393.01 $1,440.01 $1,675.20
MS21 230-6 10,658 0.00009 5 $11.24 $56.20 $818.48 $874.68 $44.96
MS2 1230-5 12,079 0.00008 5 $11.61 $58.05 $111.65 $169.70 $92.88
DAT62-78A4 20,132 0.00005 3 $654.54 $1,963.62 $1,117.06 $3,080.68 $1,309.08
REP4M6-4FS428 21,317 0.00005 3 $46.74 $140.22 $554.10 $694.32 $2,150.04
MS21232-6 25,884 0.00004 2 $10.34 $20.68 $844.39 $865.07 $20.68
MS2 1230-7 27,875 0.00004 2 $15.96 $31.92 $488.71 $520.63 $31.92
Totals 42 $4,828.17 $7,474.75 $12,302.92 $8,910.76|
" LORA Data Guide specifies 90 days for CV units, therefor this value is used for maximum resupply lead
time.
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Blanchard [Ref. 1: p. 142] states that the expected number of maintenance actions per
year is given by:
Total operating hours per year
MTBF
Replacement costs per year are determined by multiplying the expected number of
maintenance actions per year, by the unit cost of the bearing. Man hour costs are
determined by multiplying the expected number of failures per year by the average man
hour by the utilization for each part number x man hour cost per hour. Total replacement
cost per year is the sum of replacement cost and man-hour cost.
Component reliability over one year's operating time is given by:
R(t) = e -xt
Table 7 shows the results for each of the ten bearings. Individual bearing reliability
ranges from a low of 72% to a high of 91%.














Poisson distribution calculations are shown in Appendix B. An operating time of
79, 460 hrs was used. This value was obtained by multiplying the average number of
1 -y
aircraft in the fleet by the average number of flight hours for each aircraft . The
probabilities for n number of failures per year are shown as well as the cumulative
probabilities for n <= to r failures. Appendix C shows all ten distributions graphically.
3. Spare Part Levels
Based on Poisson distributions, a lead-time of 90 days, and a confidence level of
90% for part availability, individual quantities of spare parts for each part number were
calculated. Required levels are shown in Table 8. From this it is seen that based on
current failure rates, relatively small quantities of each bearing needs to be held in
inventory for S-3 support.
Table 8 : Spare Part Levels Required for a 90 Day Lead Time












The average flight hours per aircraft were 548 hrs/yr. This value was obtained from NADEP North
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4. Life Cycle Costs
Assuming that the S-3 will remain in the Navy's inventory for another 15 years
(until the year 2013), remaining life cycle costs were determined using currently
available bearings. The total life cycle cost of replacing these bearings will total
$210,000 (not adjusted for inflation).
E. Improved Bearings and Mathematical Model Results
Through use ofmodern technology and processes to manufacture airframe control
bearings, operating life can be extended without modification to the existing bearing
functional envelope. Recent advances in bearing design and manufacturing technology
provides a cost-effective ability to increase bearing life. The term "power density" is
commonly used to describe this concept of applying technology enhancements to
maximize performance [Ref. 13]. Various degrees ofpower density can be applied to
enhance bearing life and durability. These enhanced bearings will provide a minimum of
1.5 times the life of a standard bearing, although gains of 4-5 times are not uncommon
[Ref. 13].
Each of the ten bearings being studied were originally based on 1970s technology and
military specifications (MILSPEC). By applying 1990s technology and the concept of
power density to these bearings, individual component reliability can exceed current
MILSPEC for control bearings. New bearings are currently available from various
bearing manufacturers that are direct replacements, and incorporate several technologies
that result in a bearing that is more durable and corrosion resistant than those now being
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used in the flight control system. Kamatics Corporation in Bloomfield, CT, which is a
division ofKaman Bearings, provided recommendations for substitute control bearings
for this study. Kamatics bearings utilize stainless steels in both the bearing races and the
rolling elements [Ref. 15]. In doing so, the hardness ratings of the bearing are increased,
and at the same time, corrosion resistance is also significantly improved. The improved
corrosion resistance is especially important as bearing corrosion is more of a concern to
manufacturers than is bearing wear [Ref. 11].
1. Model Output Using Improved Bearings
The model used for the improved bearings is the same as the historical failure data
model. Poisson distributions and spare part levels were calculated similarly as well.
In this model, higher estimates for MTBF, and unit costs of the new bearings are entered
into the model, and the results are compared to the historical model. Based on the
assumption that by using Kamatics Corporation improved bearings, MTBF for each
bearing could be increased by a factor of three. Table 9 summarizes the new MTBFs,
expected failure rates, unit costs, and total maintenance costs estimates using the new
bearings. Unit cost figures are current market prices based on a minimum quantity order,
and do not represent final costs that would be determined through normal federal
acquisition procedures. Appendix D shows the Poisson distribution for the expected
number of failures using improved bearings.
46
























62RM 60,396 0.000017 2 $396.15 $744.93 $792.30 $1,537.23 $396.15
KMDB16-9 KSC1817
00V-2
30,198 0.000033 3 $142.25 $260.59 $426.75 $687.34 $853.50
KMDB28-8 KSC1817
00V-1




V 26,517 0.000038 3 $140.00 $305.47 $420.00 $725.47 $1,400.00
MS2 1230-5 KSC231005V 36,237 0.000028 2 $52.30 $372.02 $104.60 $476.62 $209.20
MS21230-6 KSC2310
06V 31,974 0.000031 3
$50.10 $491.04 $150.30 $641.34 $131.90
MS2 1230-7 KSC231307V 83,625 0.000012 1 $65.95 $244.29 $65.95 $310.24 $65.95
MS2 1232-6 KSC2312
06V 77,652 0.000013
1 $66.00 $422.26 $66.00 $488.26 $66.00





0.000016 2 $113.60 $369.34 $227.20 $596.54 $2,612.80
TOTALS 23 $4,496.82 $2,934.55 $7,431.37 $6,353.50
As a result of increased MTFB, the spare part quantities required for S-3 support are
reduced by 50 percent, and only one SDLM preventative maintenance change-out is
necessary. Table 10 shows the effect of increasing MTBF on bearing reliability. New
reliability figures range from 90% to 97% as compared to the historical reliability of 72%
to 91%. The percent improvement of new bearings over the old bearings is also shown.
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Table 10 : Reliability Data for Enhanced Bearings











Table 1 1 summarizes costs for the current bearings and the improved bearings. A
reduction of48% in control bearing maintenance costs can be achieved if the new
bearings can actually achieve desired MTBF.
Table 1 1 : Comparison of Current and Improved Bearings
Cost Component Current Bearings Improved Bearings
Mnhr Cost/yr $7,474.75 $4,496.82
Part Cost/yr $4,828.17 $2,482.47 |
Total Replacement Cost/yr $12,302.92 $6,979.29
SDLM Replacement Cost $8,910.76 $3,484.22 '
Total/yr $33,516.60 $17,442.80 |j
Models for both historical data and expected failure data are presented in appendix A and
B respectively.
Although the annual dollar figures involved are not significant, the savings in
maintenance man-hours are important, as fewer failures will occur as a result of increased
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mean time between failures. However, the increases in reliability and system safety that
can be obtained by replacing the current bearings should be more of a determining factor
in the decision whether to pursue the option of changing to the new bearings.
F. Summary
A mathematical model was developed to perform statistical analyze of historical
failure data for the control bearings. In analyzing the bearings, the exponential failure
distribution was used due to a lack of engineering data, which precluded the use of other
distributions, such as the Weibull Distribution. Spare part levels were also determined
using the Poisson Distribution. Based on a ninety day lead time and historical failure
rates, no more than two of each part number has to be maintained in the supply inventory.
Cost projections for bearing replacement were developed for the remaining life of the S-3
aircraft.
Analysis of advanced bearings was also performed in order to compare historical
failure data with estimated failure data of advanced bearings. The advanced bearings
incorporate modern manufacturing processes and materials that can extend current
bearing life by a factor of four to five times. In the advanced bearing model, bearing life
was extended by a factor of three, and new cost and reliability data was determined.
With the new bearings installed, total maintenance costs could be reduced by 48 percent
per year, and individual bearing reliability estimates increased by 6 to 24 percent.
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VII. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
A. Introduction
NAVAIR's Reliability Centered Maintenance Analysis process was applied to the
airframe control bearings used in the Navy's S-3 aircraft flight control system, in order to
determine if improvements in bearing reliability and maintainability can be achieved.
The IRCMS program was used to analyze each of the ten bearings being studied. Based
on the initial assumptions developed in Chapter III, the program recommended that each
bearing should be redesigned. Redesign, in the case of control bearings, requires use of
modern materials and processes. Through use of bearings that incorporate these
advances, expected failure rates can be reduced by 50 percent, and life cycle cost
reductions of 48 percent. This chapter provides conclusions and recommendations
regarding aircraft control bearings.
B. Conclusions
1. Ten aircraft control bearings used in the flight control system of the S-3
aircraft exhibit poor reliability.
During the last seven years, 300 S-3 aircraft control bearings were replaced fleet
wide. Of the twenty bearing part numbers that were monitored, ten bearings had ten or
more failures per year. The remaining ten had three or less failures per year. Bearing
failure data is summarized in Table 1 . Reliability values for the bearings is shown in
Table 7.
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2. IRCMS analysis recommends that each of the ten bearings should be
redesigned.
NAVAIRs IRCMS program was used to analyze each bearing, and based on
initial assumptions developed for this thesis, the program recommended that each should
be redesigned. Each of the ten bearings was classified as being functionally significant
through application of the FSI/SSI logic shown in Figure 2. Figure 3 shows the decision
logic that was used to reach the redesign conclusion for FSIs.
3. Aircraft control bearing reliability can be increased through application
of advanced manufacturing processes, without increasing life cycle costs.
Through use of modern technology and processes to manufacture airframe control
bearings, operating life can be extended without modification to the existing bearing
functional envelope. Recent advances in bearing design and manufacturing technology
provides a cost-effective ability to increase bearing life. These enhanced bearings will
provide a minimum of 1 .5 times the life of a standard bearing, although gains of four to
five times are not uncommon.
4. Inventory levels of aircraft control bearings for S-3 support require only
small annual quantity purchases.
Based on a mathematical analysis of historical failure data, less than ten of each
part number has to be maintained in the inventory on an annual basis. Large quantity
purchases for S-3 support are not required, and if the improved bearings can achieve the
anticipated increase in MTBF, inventory levels can be decreased by almost 50 percent.
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5. MILSPECs do not provide manufacturers with an incentive to provide
DoD with more advanced bearings.
MILSPECs are still being used by manufacturers to supply bearings to DOD.
MIL-B-7949E, dated 9 April 1 98 1 , is the current specification. All the manufacturers
contacted for this study have the capability to manufacture bearings that far exceed
MILSPEC. MILSPEC testing does not accurately simulate an aircraft's operating
environment and the results of such testing may result in a false indication of reliability.
C. Recommendations
1. Develop an Engineering Change Proposal requiring use of improved
bearings in the flight control system to replace the ten bearings analyzed in
this study.
NADEP North Island's ISST should begin a formal analysis and testing program
using improved bearings. There are several manufacturers who can provide NADEP
with bearings that can be tested.
2. Eliminate MILSPECs for control bearings, and use performance
specifications for bearing acquisition.
DOD should eliminate MILSPECs for control bearings and instead use performance
specifications as part of the acquisition process. This would result in DOD obtaining
bearings that will meet an actual operating time requirement instead of exceeding an




PART NUMBER/WUC/MAL CODE/MAN-HOUR DATA
Data .Source: Naval Aviation Logistics Data Analysis (NALDA)
Period Covered: January 1991 to June 1997
Legend:
P/N - Part Number
MANUF = Manufacturer's code
WUC = Work Unit Code
MAL CODE = Malfunction Code
EMT = Elapsed Maintenance Time
TOT MNHRS = Total Man Hours









MS21 230-7 36659 1432010 105 4.80 4.80 $107.18
36659 1472200 190 33.00 90.00 $2,009.70
AVG EMT 36659 1472210 20 1.00 1.00 $22.33
10.94 96906 1472210 20 12.50 19.90 $444.37
96906 1472210 105 10.70 20.90 $466.70
96906 1472300 20 3.30 6.60 $147.38
36659 1432M00 20 11.30 11.30 $252.33


























































































Totals 115.80 152.90 $3,414.26
KMDB28-8 97613 1181000 020 5.00 9.00 $200.97
97613 1182000 020 4.00 4.00 $89.32
AVG EMT 97613 1191900 020 4.00 7.50 $167.48
3.52 97613 1431000 020 5.50 6.50 $145.15
97613 1432300 020 1.80 1.80 $40.19
97613 1432300 020 1.30 1.30 $29.03
97613 1432300 020 4.00 7.50 $167.48
97613 1432300 020 1.00 1.00 $22.33
97613 1432600 020 4.00 6.50 $145.15
36659 1432F30 020 4.60 4.60 $102.72
Totals 35.20 49.70 $1,109.80
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MS21 230-5 96906 1115000 814 23.20 46.90 $1,047.28
96906 1181000 020 3.50 4.50 $100.49
AVG EMT 96906 1182200 020 12.08 62.25 $1,390.04
8.33 35368 1432540 070 0.50 1.00 $22.33
96906 1432900 020 7.90 15.80 $352.81
96906 1472210 020 4.17 6.43 $143.66
96906 13A1900 020 11.10 14.10 $314.85
36659 1431C80 020 3.10 3.10 $69.22
96906 1432B00 020 6.00 9.00 $200.97
96906 1432C00 020 12.25 12.25 $273.54
36659 1432D10 020 4.10 4.10 $91.55
36659 1432E00 105 20.50 20.50 $457.77
96906 1432E00 105 1.80 1.80 $40.19
96906 1432E00 846 39.70 52.30 $1,167.86
96906 1432E00 020 1.00 1.50 $33.50
96906 1432E10 105 5.00 9.00 $200.97
96906 1432E10 105 4.80 9.30 $207.67
36659 1432F10 020 2.50 5.00 $111.65
36659 1432F40 020 4.10 8.20 $183.11
36659 1432F40 020 3.60 7.20 $160.78
96906 1481E10 020 4.00 4.00 $89.32
Totals 174.89 298.23 $6,659.55
MS21 230-6 96906 1182200 020 6.10 12.50 $279.13
36659 1472200 170 16.50 45.00 $1,004.85
AVG EMT 96906 1472210 020 6.25 9.95 $222.18
7.33 96906 1472300 020 1.65 3.30 $73.69
96906 13A2Q20 020 18.00 22.50 $502.43
96906 1432B00 020 6.00 9.00 $200.97
96906 1432B00 020 2.50 2.50 $55.83
96906 1432B00 020 7.50 15.00 $334.95
• 96906 1432C00 020 12.25 12.25 $273.54
36659 1432D00 020 4.70 11.70 $261.26
96906 1432D00 020 3.80 5.80 $129.51
36659 1432D10 105 6.00 11.50 $256.80
36659 1432D10 020 4.05 4.05 $90.44
Totals 95.30 165.05 $3,685.57
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MS21 232-6 36659 1412590 020 15.10 15.10 $337.18
96906 1412590 020 18.00 207.00 $4,622.31
AVG EMT 96906 1412590 020 7.40 12.60 $281.36
18.91 96906 1412590 020 10.40 15.70 $350.58
96906 1412590 020 19.00 19.00 $424.27
96906 1412590 020 19.40 31.20 $696.70
96906 1412590 020 23.50 32.50 $725.73
96906 1421100 020 12.70 16.30 $363.98
36659 1412B10 020 10.30 13.30 $296.99
96906 14211D0 020 21.50 42.50 $949.03
96906 14211 DO 020 53.20 77.90 $1,739.51
96906 14211 DO 020 27.40 45.70 $1,020.48
96906 14211 DO 020 13.30 26.40 $589.51
96906 14211 DO 020 13.50 23.40 $522.52
Totals 264.70 578.60 $12,920.14
DAT62-78A4 36659 1412200 020 78.00 270.00 $6,029.10
77896 1412200 105 5.00 7.00 $156.31
AVG EMT 36659 1412300 020 1.30 2.60 $58.06
16.68 77896 1412500 020 9.30 22.60 $504.66
77896 1412500 020 14.00 28.00 $625.24
36659 1412510 020 7.70 14.60 $326.02
77896 1412530 020 15.90 35.00 $781.55
77896 1412570 135 2.20 2.40 $53.59
Totals 133.40 382.20 $8,534.53
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KMDB16-9 97613 1181000 020 5.00 10.00 $223.30
97613 1181000 020 5.00 9.00 $200.97
AVG EMT 97613 1432000 020 3.70 3.70 $82.62
3.89 97613 1432300 070 3.70 4.90 $109.42
36659 1432600 020 3.70 16.80 $375.14
97613 1481000 020 3.70 6.30 $140.68
36659 1481630 020 3.70 3.00 $66.99
36659 1481630 020 3.70 5.30 $118.35
97613 1481630 135 3.70 15.00 $334.95
97613 1481630 020 3.70 4.50 $100.49
97613 1481630 020 3.70 5.30 $118.35
36659 1484900 020 3.70 17.00 $379.61
36659 1431C30 020 3.70 15.00 $334.95
97613 1431 C30 020 3.70 3.30 $73.69
Totals 54.40 119.10 $2,659.50
KP16BS-FS428 21335 1431300 020 1.50 3.00 $66.99
21335 1431300 020 7.30 14.30 $319.32
AVG EMT 36659 1431400 020 0.90 0.90 $20.10
4.56 21335 1432300 020 10.10 11.10 $247.86
21335 1432600 020 6.80 6.80 $151.84
21335 030ASP0 020 2.80 2.80 $62.52
21335 1113A30 020 2.25 3.75 $83.74
21335 1113A30 020 2.75 2.75 $61.41
21335 1113A30 020 5.30 10.30 $230.00
21335 1113A30 710 10.00 170.00 $3,796.10
21335 466D4E0 020 0.50 1.00 $22.33
Totals 50.20 226.70 $5,062.21
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MS289134A 36659 1412300 020
36659 1412400 105
AVG EMT 36659 1412500 020









































P(n) = Probability of "n" number of failures
P(N<,= r) = Probability of "n" less than or equal to "r" number of failures
MS289134A KP16BS-FS428 REP4M6-4FS428
n#of P(n) P(n< = r) P(n) P(n< = r) P(n) P(n<,= r)
failures
0.01% 0.01% 0.01% 0.01% 2.41% 0.01%
1 0.08% 0.08% 0.11% 0.12% 8.97% 11.37%
2 0.36% 0.44% 0.50% 0.63% 16.71% 28.08%
3 1.12% 1.56% 1.51% 2.14% 20.76% 48.84%
4 2.65% 4.21% 3.39% 5.53% 19.35% 68.19%
5 4.99% 9.21% 6.10% 11.63% 14.42% 82.61%
6 7.85% 17.05% 9.14% 20.77% 8.96% 91.57%
7 10.57% 27.62% 11.74% 32.51% 4.77% 96.35%
8 12.45% 40.07% 13.19% 45.70% 2.22% 98.57%
9 13.05% 53.12% 13.18% 58.88% 0.92% 99.49%
10 12.30% 65.42% 11.84% 70.72% 0.34% 99.83%
11 10.54% 75.96% 9.68% 80.40% 0.12% 99.95%
12 8.28% 84.24% 7.25% 87.65% 0.04% 99.99%
13 6.01% 90.25% 5.01% 92.67% 0.01% 100.00%
14 4.05% 94.30% 3.22% 95.89% 0.00% 100.00%
15 2.54% 96.84% 1.93% 97.82% 0.00% 100.00%
16 1.50% 98.34% 1.08% 98.90% 0.00% 100.00%














































































































P(n) P(n< = r) P(n) P(n< = r) P(n) P(n< = r)
0.14% 5.78% 5.78% 2.41% 0.01% 1.93% 1.93%
1.05% 16.48% 22.26% 14.25% 16.66% 7.62% 9.55%
4.06% 23.49% 45.75% 21.88% 38.53% 15.04% 24.60%
10.66% 22.32% 68.07% 22.39% 60.92% 19.79% 44.39%
21.50% 15.90% 83.97% 17.18% 78.10% 19.53% 63.92%
35.78% 9.07% 93.04% 10.55% 88.65% 15.42% 79.34%
51.42% 4.31% 97.35% 5.40% 94.05% 10.14% 89.48%
66.13% 1.75% 99.10% 2.37% 96.41% 5.72% 95.20%
78.22% 0.63% 99.73% 0.91% 97.32% 2.82% 98.02%
87.06% 0.20% 99.92% 0.31% 97.63% 1.24% 99.25%
92.87% 0.06% 99.98% 0.10% 97.73% 0.49% 99.74%
96.35% 0.01% 100.00% 0.03% 97.75% 0.18% 99.92%
98.25% 0.00% 100.00% 0.01% 97.76% 0.06% 99.98%
99.22% 0.00% 100.00% 0.00% 97.76% 0.02% 99.99%
99.67% 0.00% 100.00% 0.00% 97.76% 0.00% 100.00%
99.87% 0.00% 100.00% 0.00% 97.76% 0.00% 100.00%
99.95% 0.00% 100.00% 0.00% 97.76% 0.00% 100.00%
99.98% 0.00% 100.00% 0.00% 97.76%
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P(n) = Probability of "n" number of failures
P(N<,= r) = Probability of "n" less than or equal to "r" number of failures
MS289134A KSC230162RM MS21151 -8C
n#of
'^1 lurpc
P(n) P(n<,= r) P(n) P(n<, = r) P(n) P(n<,= r)
all ui Co
7.4% 7.4% 45.4% 45.4% 42.7% 42.7%
1 19.2% 26.5% 35.8% 81.3% 36.3% 79.1%
2 25.0% 51.6% 14.1% 95.4% 15.4% 94.5%
3 21.8% 73.4% 3.7% 99.1% 4.4% 98.9%
4 14.2% 87.6% 0.7% 99.9% 0.9% 99.8%
5 7.4% 95.0% 0.1% 100.0% 0.2% 100.0%
6 3.2% 98.2% 0.0% 100.0% 0.0% 100.0%
7 1.2% 99.5% 0.0% 100.0% 0.0% 100.0%
8 0.4% 99.8% 0.0% 100.0% 0.0% 100.0%
KSC181700V-2 KSC231K)6V KSC23 1206V
n#of P(n) P(n<,= r) P(n) P(n<,= r) P(n) P(n< ,= r)
failures
11.9% 11.9% 16.2% 16.2% 7.4% 7.4%
1 25.4% 37.3% 29.5% 45.7% 19.2% 26.5%
2 27.0% 64.3% 26.8% 72.5% 25.0% 51.6%
3 19.1% 83.4% 16.3% 88.8% 21.8% 73.4%
4 10.1% 93.5% 7.4% 96.2% 14.2% 87.6%
5 4.3% 97.9% 2.7% 98.9% 7.4% 95.0%
6 1.5% 99.4% 0.8% 99.7% 3.2% 98.2%
7 0.5% 99.8% 0.2% 99.9% 1.2% 99.5%
8 0.1% 100.0% 0.0% 100.0% 0.4% 99.8%
9 0.0% 100.0% 0.0% 100.0% 0.1% 100.0%
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KSC23 1005V KSC23 1307V





















































Part Number = Bearing Part Number
MTBF = Historical Mean Time Between Failure (in hours)
Failure Rate = Number of failures per hour
# exp fails/yr = Number of expected failures per year
Unit Cost = Unit cost of the bearing
TPC ~ Total bearing parts cost per year
Mnrh Cost/exp maint/yr = Man-hour cost per expected maintenance action per year
TRC/yr = Total replacement cost per year (summation of parts cost and man-hour cost)
SDLM Costs = Parts cost for two SDLM replacements
Part Number MTBF Failure #exp Unit TPC/yr Mnhr TRC/yr SDLM
Rate fails/yr Cost Cost/exp
maint/yr
Costs
MS289134A 8,428 0.00012 6 $46.14 $276.84 $2,102.08 $2,378.92 $369.12
KP16BS-FS428 8,839 0.00011 6 $45.74 $274.44 $611.44 $885.88 $914.80
KMDB16-9 10,066 0.00010 5 $191.84 $959.20 $433.84 $1,393.04 $2,302.08
KMDB28-8 10,354 0.00010 5 $209.40 $1,047.00 $393.01 $1,440.01 $1,675.20
MS2 1230-6 10,658 0.00009 5 $11.24 $56.20 $818.48 $874.68 $44.96
MS2 1230-5 12,079 0.00008 5 $11.61 $58.05 $111.65 $169.70 $92.88
DAT62-78A4 20,132 0.00005 3 $654.54 $1,963.62 $1,117.06 $3,080.68 $1,309.08
REP4M6- 21,317 0.00005 3 $46.74 $140.22 $554.10 $694.32 $2,150.04
4FS428
MS2 1232-6 25,884 0.00004 2 $10.34 $20.68 $844.39 $865.07 $20.68
MS21 230-7 27,875 0.00004 2 $15.96 $31.92 $488.71 $520.63 $31.92
Totals 42 $4,828.17 $7,474.75 $12,302.92 $8,910.76
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Spare parts needed (SP) per unit:
SP/unit = L*t + z 1 .a*(L*t)
05
t =90 days per LORA DEFAULT DATA GUIDE, however, assume parts are purchased
annually.
Zi-a is the value of the standard normal variate corresponding to the confidence
level "a"
for a 90% spare availability probability, zi.a is 1.28











MS21 230-7 1 $15.96
Total $2,552.68
Remaining Life Cycle Costs (assuming no change in costs)
Total $cost of fleet replacements $7,380.85
and spares (per year)
Total "O" level maintenance $14,855.60
costs per year (Parts&Labor)
Remaining Life Cycle costs $23 1 ,745






Part Number = Bearing Part Number
MTBF = Historical Mean Time Between Failure (in hours)
Failure Rate = Number of failures per hour
# exp fails/yr = Number of expected failures per year
Unit Cost = Unit cost of the bearing
MC/exp mt/yr = Man-hour cost per expected maintenance action per year
TPC/yr = Total parts cost per year
TRC/yr = Total replacement cost per year (summation of parts cost and man-hour cost)
SDLM Costs = Parts cost for one SDLM replacement
Current New Part MTBF Failure #exp Unit MC/exp TPC/yr TRC/yr SDLM
Part Number Rate fails/yr Cost mt/yr Costs
Number
DAT62- KSC230162 60,396 0.000017
78A4 RM
KMDB16-9 KSC1 81700 30,198 0.000033
V-2
KMDB28-8 KSC181700 31,062 0.000032
V-l
KP16BS- KRP16BSV 26,517 0.000038
FS428
MS2 1230-5 KSC231005 36,237 0.000028
V
MS21230-6 KSC231006 31,974 0.000031
V
MS21230-7 KSC231307 83,625 0.000012
V




REP4M6- MS21151-8C 63,951 0.000016
4FS428
2 $396.15 $744.93 $792.30 $1,537.23 $396.15
3 $142.25 $260.59 $426.75 $687.34 $853.50
3 $169.15 $235.80 $507.45 $743.25 $182.96
3 $45. 74 $305.47 $137.22 $442.69 $457.40
2 $52.30 $372.02 $104.60 $476.62 $209.20
3 $50.10 $491.04 $150.30 $641.34 $131.90
1 $65.95 $244.29 $65.95 $310.24 $65.95
1 $66.00 $422.26 $66.00 $488.26 $66.00
3 $46.14 $1,051.07 • $138.42 $1,189.49 $46.14
2 $46. 74 $369.34 $93.48 $462.82 $1,075.02
TOTALS 23 $4,496.82 $2,482.47 $6,979.29 S3.484.22
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New New Current % imp
Part Numbers Reliability Reliability
KSC230162RM 0.96 0.87 9.83%
KSC181700V-2 0.91 0.76 20.13%
KSC181700V-1 0.92 0.77 18.87%
KRP16BSV 0.90 0.73 23.49%
KSC23 1005V 0.93 0.8 15.86%
} ,C23 1006V 0.92 0.77 19.17%
KSC23 1307V 0.97 0.91 6.34%
KSC23 1206V 0.97 0.90 7.25%
TBA 0.90 0.72 24.58%
MS21151-8C 0.96 0.88 8.85%
Spare parts required (SP) per
unit:
SP/unit = L*t + zi.a*(L*t)
0.5
Zi-a is the value of the standard normal variate corresponding to the confidence level "a"



























Remaining Life Cycle Costs (assuming no change in costs)
Total $ parts cost of fleet replacements
and spares (per $3,562.99
year)
Total "O" level maintenance replacement costs (parts & man-hours) per year
$6,979.29
Remaining Life Cycle Costs (including 1 SDLM Period)
$108,173.50
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